Hans-Georg Gadamer wants to uphold the inseparability of thought and language, and so does John Arthos in his new book, *The Inner Word in Gadamer’s Hermeneutics.*\(^1\) Arthos focuses on the Augustinian and Thomistic concept of inner word, *verbum interius,* not only because it looks to be a crucial nodal point linking language and the inner workings of the mind, but also because Gadamer himself indicated that his hermeneutical thinking has grown from it as a crucial point of departure (IW 98; cf. 1). The importance of this concept and its history is enough to justify a whole book devoted to the interpretation of a single ten page section of *Wahrheit und Methode,* containing Gadamer’s discussion of the inner word (III, 3, B).\(^2\)

It turns out to be a strikingly ambivalent section. It includes a paragraph of sharply critical rhetorical questions aimed at Augustine (cf. IW 265f.; TM 381), who gave the West the concept of *verbum interius* together with the insistence that it does not in fact have anything to do with language. “It is not Greek nor Latin nor of any other tongue,” Augustine insists (*On the Trinity* 15:19), but a word of the intellect alone—precisely thought without speech! Gadamer quite rightly identifies this as a consequence of Augustine’s “thoroughly Platonist devaluation of sensible phenomena” (IW 249; TM 380), and Arthos comments, “This part of Augustine’s theory is anathema to hermeneutics” (IW 250).

Arthos’s condemnation of Augustine at this point is strikingly, though no doubt inadvertently, ecclesiastical, employing the word “anathema,” which is the solemn term used for cursing a heretic who preaches a false gospel.\(^3\) If philosophical hermeneutics is meant to be good news—in that sense a kind of *evangelion* or gospel—then it apparently originated with a concept that turned out to be heretical. It is all the more interesting that this heresy is represented by the great church father Augustine, who is the fountainhead of Christian orthodoxy in the West as well as the source of the concept of *verbum interius.* Something interesting and complex is going on here, in Gadamer’s text as well as Arthos’s.

As a first approximation, I’d say what’s happening is that Augustine is not quite what any of us want him to be. This has been a repeated theme of my own scholarship for years: I’m an Augustine scholar who brings to both Catholic and Protestant theologians the bad news that Augustine isn’t quite what they want him to be. Above all, he is more Platonist than anyone really wants him to be, and in that regard Gadamer is in the same boat with the theologians.

**Distinguishing Sensible and Intelligible**

Well, what’s wrong with Platonism, after all? As Gadamer notes (IW 279; TM 382), Plato describes thinking as an inner conversation of the soul with itself, and the point of this description is precisely to support Plato’s contention that “thought [*dianoia*] and speech [*logos*] are the same.”\(^4\) This sounds pretty close to the desired unity, even though Gadamer thinks that “Plato undoubtedly did not consider that the process of thought, if conceived as a dialogue of the soul, itself involves a connection with language” (TM 368; cf. IW 280). Nonetheless, you would think that this is closer to the unity of thought and speech Gadamer is after than the concept of the inner word, which Augustine explicitly denies is the kind of thinking we do when we silently use the words of a particular language. Again, Gadamer is well aware of this, and alludes to the passage where Augustine insists that the inner word is “neither uttered [*prolativum*] in sound nor thought of in the likeness of sound [*cogitativum in similitudine soni*].”\(^5\) The inner...
word is precisely not what Plato seems to have been thinking of, a speaking silently to ourselves in a particular language. It has no such connection with sensible sound, not even imagined sound. To grasp it, says Augustine, we must understand a word “not only before it sounds, but even before the images of its sounds are considered in thought, for this is something that pertains to no language.”

This is why Augustine says that when the inner word is uttered externally, i.e., “spoken in sound or some other bodily sign,” then “it is not spoken as it is, but as it can be seen or heard by the body.” Plato had never envisioned so sharp and explicit a contrast between the intelligible logos of the mind and the sensible sound of language. In this regard Augustine is more Platonist than Plato is.

The Platonist contrast between sensible and intelligible is something Plato sometimes forgets, but never Augustine. It systematically governs Augustine’s talk about the inner word and indeed the whole inner space of the soul. The point is that the soul is a different dimension of being from the body, a higher and incorporeal dimension of being that is closer to God. This closeness is of course not a bodily or spatial proximity, but consists precisely in its capacity for intellectual vision, its ability to see the Platonic ideas in the mind of God. So the inner word is an intellectual word, the product of intellect in its love of vision. For by love the intellect either draws near or else turns away and departs from the intelligible Truth, the way the Prodigal Son goes into a far country and later returns to his divine Father in a voyage that was “not by feet” in a key Neoplatonist metaphor in Augustine’s Confessions. To be close to God is to love and seek understanding of divine Truth, whereas to be far from God is to love created things more than their Creator. This closeness is often tracked by the language of superiority (the soul is higher and better than bodies, and its power of reason is higher and better than the senses, which it shares with the souls of beasts), but also by the language of inwardness. The inner is higher, better, more intelligible, and closer to God than are external, sensible, and bodily things, including the sounding words of human language. And within the inner life of the soul, the intellect is more inward than the imagination, where we speak to ourselves silently in words that are still images of the sounding words outside us.

Augustine does not deny that the inner word can be formed by our understanding of external things. This becomes a key point in the Thomistic argument cited by Gadamer, to the effect that the inner word need not be reflective. But insofar as the inner word is an apt analogy to the procession of the eternal Word in the Trinity, it is indeed reflective, or rather introspective: for the mind is not like the eye, which has to look outside itself to see itself, using something like a mirror as a medium of reflection. Instead, it turns directly to itself: “something pertaining to its own nature is in its sight and it is called back to it when it thinks of itself by a turning that is incorporeal, not in the dimension of space.” Though there is a sense in which the mind is in its own memory even when it’s not thinking about itself, what generates the inner word is this active turning or conversion of the mind to itself, which puts itself directly in its own mental sight: “And in this way, when the mind turns to itself in thought, it makes a trinity, in which now a verbum also can be understood; for it is formed out of the thought itself, with the will joining them both.” Hence I think Arthos gets it wrong here when he says, commenting on this same book of Augustine’s treatise On the Trinity, that “the act of reflection . . . is not a conscious turning of the mind to self, as if such a thing were possible” (IW 127). Quite the contrary: in Augustine, the turning of the mind to itself, putting itself in its own sight (conspectus ejus), is exactly what it means to think about itself, and this is how it generates an inner word that serves in an analogy of the divine Trinity.

The point is ontological: as God is not dependent on the creation in order to know himself or to generate his eternal Word, so the mind does not have to look outside itself—which is to say, at something inferior to itself—to understand itself. This parallel explains why the movement of the second half of Augustine’s great treatise On the Trinity (books 8–15) is ever more inward, a journey deeper into “the inner man,” a grand execution of the project of inward turn that has been on

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Augustine’s mind since near the beginning of his career as a Christian writer. This turning of the soul to itself is mapped on the terrain of the ontological hierarchy of a Christian Neoplatonism, where God is higher and more inward than the soul, which is higher and more inward than bodies.\textsuperscript{14} The \textit{verbum interius} takes its place at the higher levels of this inward journey of the soul, closer to the ultimate inwardness of God. So it’s not accidental that it has nothing to do with outward things like language.

\textbf{Augustine’s Semiotic Theory of Language}

That is not the end of the bad news about Augustine for Gadamer’s hermeneutical project. The reason the inner word has nothing essentially to do with language is that “it comes before all the signs by which it is signified,” including those audible signs we ordinarily call “words.”\textsuperscript{15} The notion that words are signs is not accidental, but part of the foundation of Augustine’s philosophy of language, which puts him in the camp of those who, in Gadamer’s view, make language into “a mere tool of communication” (TM 375), an “instrument of subjectivity” (TM 377). To think of words as signs “takes us away from the nature of language” (ibid.), Gadamer contends in the section of \textit{Truth and Method} immediately preceding his discussion of the inner word. He sees this semiotic view of language as intimately connected with the real result at which Plato is aiming in his own treatment of language in the \textit{Cratylus}: “to demonstrate that no objective truth (\textit{aletheia ton onton}) can be attained in language” (TM 378).

Augustine is indeed an heir of Plato in this regard. In his early work, especially the inner dialogue with Reason for which he invents the new Latin term \textit{Soliloquia}—“soliloquies,” the inner dialogues of one who is alone—Augustine contends that a bodily or sensible thing is never “truly true” (\textit{vere verum}) because it has “no true form and beauty” (\textit{vera . . . forma et species}) but only “a kind of image of the true” (\textit{quaedam imago veritatis}) and thus is at best \textit{verisimilar} or similar to the truth, “true by a sort of imitation” (\textit{imitatione aliqua verum}).\textsuperscript{16} Though he does not try to carry through this distinction for long, his semiotic theory of language does step into this ontological framework in which the truth we ultimately seek is not to be found in external things, including language.

Hence his early treatment of language in the treatise \textit{On the Teacher} begins by positing that “words are signs” (par. 3) and ends by arguing that “nothing is learned through its signs” (par. 33) and in particular, “we learn nothing from those signs that are called words” (par. 34). This is clearly not a promising semiotics for those who want to find in language the truth of being. Once again, the sensible/intelligible distinction determines the ontological and epistemological landscape here, combined with Augustine’s new brand of Platonist inwardness: words do have a use, he argues, which is to admonish and remind us to look with our own minds and see for ourselves, learning not from sensible things but from the inner teacher, which is Christ—not Christ externally incarnate in flesh, but Christ as eternal Truth and Wisdom (replacing the figure of Reason, the inner teacher in \textit{Soliloquies}), who teaches us intelligible things by revealing them to us in the intellectual light shining within our souls (par. 38).

Augustine’s theory of language is thus an exquisite example of Gadamer’s point that once Plato carries out his intention in the \textit{Cratylus}, which is to “banish knowledge to the intelligible sphere,” the only alternative is to treat words as signs. This is an “epoch-making decision about thought concerning language,” Gadamer continues, because “ever since in all discussions of language the concept of image (\textit{eikon}) has been replaced by that of the sign (\textit{semeion} or \textit{semainon}),” although he notes this is “not especially emphasized” in Plato’s text itself (TM 374). I don’t think Gadamer has got this quite right. It is true that Plato set the stage for a semiotic theory of language, but the theory did not explicitly emerge until Augustine. There are reasons why no such theory could have emerged in Greek thought.

I have tried to show elsewhere that Augustine was in fact the first thinker to classify words as a species of signs. He must virtually re-invent ancient semiotics to do so. Greek semiotics had

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been exclusively a theory of inference, never a theory of linguistic meaning. This is why Plato never treated words as a type of sign (semeion, which should not be confused with semainon, which is the term for semantics not semiotics; semainon is indeed a term that concerns linguistic meaning, but it is used by the Stoics, sticklers for technical vocabulary, who insist on distinguishing it sharply from semeion, which concerns empirical inference, not language). Aristotle, likewise, is often thought to classify words as a type of sign in the opening page of his logical treatise On Interpretation, but this is in fact a medieval reading which assimilates Aristotle’s view to Augustine’s. The Greek semeion is a sensible object which lets you know of the presence of some hidden object—the stock example being that smoke is a sign (semeion) of fire. This is not a promising basis for a semiotic account of the nature of language. What enables Augustine to arrive at a semiotics of language is the distinctively Latin usage of terms like significare, which had no equivalent in Greek, because they concerned not the direction of inference from sign to thing signified, but the direction of expression from the soul’s communicative intent to the bodily signs that express it. We can see this usage of significare quite vividly in Cicero’s writings on rhetoric, in which significations are bodily hints and gestures that convey the emotions of the speaker’s soul (motus animi). It’s Augustine who applies this expressionist semiotics to language, classifying words as signs used by the soul to signify and express its will to communicate. Augustine’s semiotic theory of language is presented at the beginning of the second book of On Christian Doctrine, and becomes decisive for Western semiotics ever since. There could be no Saussure or Derrida without it.

The Inner Word as Theological Analogy

Augustine’s expressionist semiotics is indeed Platonist in inspiration, for reasons closely related to the ontological point about the soul’s closeness to God discussed above. Once again the distinction between sensible and intelligible is crucial to keep in mind. The thoughts of our souls are not perceptible to the bodily senses, so in our fallen state where intellectual vision is insufficient for one mind to understand another, we need words as sensible intermediaries between soul and soul. This is why the inner word becomes incarnate, as it were, “made sound” (fit sonum) in a way analogous to the divine Word “made flesh” (fit carmem), so that it might traverse the distance between soul and soul.

This “incarnation” of the word of the human mind in sound is an analogy Augustine develops in the context of his semiotic theory of language in On Christian Doctrine, a decade or more before the treatise On the Trinity, though he does not yet use the term “inner word.”

In order that what we carry in our mind may be brought into the mind of a hearer through the ears of the flesh, the word we bear in our hearts [verbum quod corde gestamus] is made sound and called speech [locutio]. Yet our thought is not turned into that sound but rather, while remaining whole in itself, takes on the form of the voice [formam vocis] by which it insinuates itself into the ears without any blemish of change. Thus the Word of God, unchanged, nonetheless was “made flesh and dwelt among us.”

You will notice that the key point of the analogy is that the word remains unchanged, even as it assumes or takes on [assumit] a lower form: the intelligible word of the heart or mind (which Augustine later calls verbum interius) taking on the form of the audible voice and the eternal Word of God, the second person of the Trinity, taking on human flesh. For the ontological hierarchy of Platonism does not allow for lower things to change higher things. The eternal God remains absolutely unchangeable, even in the incarnation (or else the incarnate God would no longer be God) while the inner word of the heart remains whole in itself, still dwelling in the heart, even as it assumes the lower, sensible form of audible words. This is the ontological reason why the inner word is not in Latin or Greek or any other language. It is above the sensible level of being and remains so, even when it assumes the form of audible speech. Otherwise it would not be a good analogy for the eternal Word, which remains immutable even when it assumes the form of mortal flesh.

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The trinitarian form of the inner word analogy develops a bit later in Augustine’s career. Here, the key point is to make sure the eternal Word, the second person of the Trinity, is not made to depend on his relation to the created world. Unlike some earlier, pre-Nicene forms of trinitarian doctrine, the eternal word in Augustine’s theology does not proceed from God the Father in order to create the world. He proceeds as the Father’s own Word of self-understanding, the intellect of God knowing itself. The Word is thus eternally begotten of the Father, “begotten not created” as the Nicene creed says, and would have existed even if God had never created the world and Jesus of Nazareth had never existed. Again, this is one more reason why the inner word cannot have an essential relation to audible language: it would imply by analogy that the eternal Word had an essential relation to the creation, which would make him less than God the Father, as in the pre-Nicene form of trinitarianism called “subordinationism.” Gadamer is indicating his awareness of this point when he says “the direct reference to utterance [Ausserung] and becoming sound [Lautwerden] is in the end rejected by Christian theology along with the rejection of subordinationism” (IW 239; TM 380).

In short, there are systematic ontological, epistemological and theological reasons why the verbum interius in Augustine cannot have any essential connection with language. As a result, it is not really a promising concept for Gadamer’s purposes, and that is why his section on the inner word is so complex and ambivalent. Things do not really get any better when he moves to discuss scholastic theology and Thomas Aquinas. The Thomistic texts he has in mind (helpfully presented in an appendix in Arthos’ volume) do not make any essential connection between the inner word and language. This is as we should expect, since they are operating under the same theological constraints as Augustine: the inner word is developed primarily as an analogy to the eternal Word in the Trinity, which means it cannot have any essential relation to what is ontologically inferior to it, not even when it is “incarnate” in sound. However much the term verbum interius may have stirred Gadamer’s thoughts at the beginning of his hermeneutical journey, it does not seem to me to offer much help in conceiving of the essential unity of thought and language.

A Powerful Alternative

It would be a mistake to suppose that Augustine fell short of an adequate account of the hermeneutical experience because of a rigid or doctrinaire Platonism. This is not because Augustine is no Platonist, but because his Platonism is not rigid and doctrinaire. On the contrary it is supple and powerful, providing a nuanced and compelling interpretation of the experience of understanding that has formed the Western imagination for centuries. It does not represent a failure to appreciate the unity of language and thought, but rather presents, quite deliberately, a powerful alternative to the unity of language and thought—an alternative, that is, to what Gadamer thinks is at the heart of the hermeneutical experience. Augustine wants understanding (intellectus) to be something higher and prior and more inward than language, and his expressionist semiotics has taught some of the most important thinkers of the West to want the same thing.

To conclude, then, let me present a sample of this power, found in a little-known passage from Augustine’s treatise On Catechizing the Unlearned (par. 3). The passage is about tradition, in a very active sense: the catechizing Augustine is concerned with is leading up to baptism, which is preceded by the traditio symboli, literally the “handing down of the creed.” Those receiving instruction for baptism, called catechumens, were not taught the creed until shortly before baptism, in a formal ceremony in which the creed was handed down (tradidi) to them. Thus the work of catechizing is the interpretive work of preparing catechumens for this act of tradition, so that they will understand the creed, which summarizes the faith into which they are going to be baptized.

The problem is that catechetical lectures get boring. Why is that, when what they have to express is so important, even beautiful? Augustine’s explanation focuses on the difference in ontological levels between the spoken language of the lecture and the understanding (intellectus).
it is supposed to convey. The outward word of discourse is just not adequate for expressing the traces (vestigia) of understanding that remain in memory after the intuitive flash of understanding that so excites the mind. These traces are what Augustine later in his career calls the inner word.

So here is the explanation of why Augustine often finds his own lectures boring:

I too am almost always displeased by my own discourse [sermo]. I am eager for something better, which I often enjoy inwardly before beginning to unfold it in sounding words, and insofar as I fall short of this initial impulse I am grieved that my tongue cannot suffice for my heart. For my will is that those who hear me may understand all that I understand, and I realize that I have not spoken well enough to accomplish this, precisely because such understanding saturates the mind like a quick flash of light, while the speaking is long and drawn-out and far different, and as it rolls on, the other has already concealed itself in its hiding place. Nevertheless, because it impresses a certain kind of traces upon the memory, it lasts through the period of time taken up by the syllables.

And it is because of such traces that we are able to carry through to completion the sounding signs which we call Latin or Greek, Hebrew or whatever other language, whether we merely think these signs or actually utter them with the voice. For these traces are neither Latin nor Greek nor Hebrew, and they are not the property of any one people, but act in the mind as the face does in the body. We say “anger” one way in Latin, another way in Greek, and yet another for each different language; but an angry face is neither Latin nor Greek. Hence not all peoples will understand when someone says “tratus sum,” but only the Latins; but if the emotion burning in the soul bursts forth in the face and affects the expression on it, everyone realizes that they’re looking at someone who’s angry.

Yet we are not allowed by the sound of our voices to bring forth and as it were spread out before the sense of our hearers these traces which understanding impressed upon our memory, in the same way that a face is plain and manifest; for these are within, in the mind, while that is outside in the body. From this one can conclude how far different the sound in our ear is from that stroke of understanding, when it is not even similar to those impressions of the memory.

Augustine here interprets his experience of language in terms of a three-level Platonist hierarchy of God, soul and body. What Augustine loves is that moment of intellectual vision in which, with a flash of intuition, the soul inwardly touches the eternity of divine Truth above it. This contact with eternity is brought down to a lower ontological level when it impresses its traces in the soul’s own memory—traces which Augustine later calls verbum interius—and then it is brought down to the lowest level when it is expressed outwardly in words accessible to the bodily senses, using Latin or some other language.

This is a powerful interpretation of the experience of understanding which has held sway in the West for centuries, and the separation of language and thought is one of its essential consequences. It has convinced many Westerners that at the center of their minds or hearts is the possibility of an experience of the divine that is too deep for words. I think this interpretation of experience—and for that matter of the divine—is a mistake, but it is certainly not a trivial one, a mere piece of thoughtless rigidity. It is an epochal and innovative approach to semiotics that has led to the conviction, still widely taken for granted today, that language is merely an inadequate outward expression or sign of a deeper, more inward, pre-verbal experience.

ENDNOTES

2. I will translate from the German given in The Inner Word, which includes the text of the whole section together with translation and commentary, but I will also give page numbers from Gadamer, Truth and Method (New York: Crossroad, 1985). Cited inline as TM.
3. See the use of the Greek term anathema in the New
Testament letter of Paul to the Galatians 1:8f., which is the model for the anathemas appended to the original Nicene Creed, for which see, e.g., J. N. D. Kelly, *Early Christian Doctrines* (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1978), 232.

4. *Sophist* 263e; cf. also *Theaetetus* 189e, where again *dianoia* is a *logos* that the soul has with itself. And cf. *Philebus* 38c39a, where this silent inner dialogue is dramatized and then explained as a kind of writing (*graphein*) of words (*logoi*) on the soul. Note also that the spoken *logoi* is described as “the image of *dianoia* in the voice” in *Theaetetus* 308c.


7. Ibid., 15:20. Gadamer quotes the second half of this in Latin: “non dicitur, sicuti est, sed sicut potest videri audirive [not “audivire” as in Arthos] per cor-

8. “There is nothing of all that God created that is closer to him than the soul,” Augustine says in an early work, *On the Quantity of the Soul*, 77. That closeness is due to the possibility of inward illumination (*On the Morals of the Church*, 18) which pertains to the reason and understanding of the mind, by which the human soul is superior to the irrational animals (*City of God* 11:2). In this same higher, intellectual part of the soul is located the true image of the triune God, which explains why “there is nothing in all of God’s creation so close to him in nature,” *City of God* 11:26.

9. In a little essay “On Ideas” (= *On 83 Different Questions*, 46), Augustine makes the first and decisive argument in the Christian West for the thesis that Platonic Ideas are constituents of the mind of God, with the implication that Platonic intellectual vision is actually the vision of God. It’s worth noting, for this audience, that the argument proceeds by describing Platonic ideas as *logoi*, and translating *logoi* as *rationes*, the divine reasons or formative plans in God’s mind by which the creation is formed. For discussion cf. Phillip Cary, Augustine’s *Invention of the Inner Self* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 53f. A translation of “On Ideas” is included in the appendix to this book.

10. The striking amalgam of the Biblical parable of the Prodigal Son with the Plotinian imagery of a journey not by feet or ship or chariot (*Enneads* 1:6.8) is used to explain the possibility of the soul’s distance as well as nearness to God in *Confessions* 1:28.


12. “Aliquid pertinens ad ejus naturam sit conspectus ejus, et in eam, quando se cogitat, non quasi loci spatium, sed incorporea conversione revocetur” (Augustine, *On the Trinity* 14:8).

13. “Ac per hoc, quando [mens] ad se ipsam cogitatio
turbit, fit trinitas, in qua jam et verbum possit intelligi; formatur quippe ex ipsa cogitacione, voluntate utrumque jungente” (ibid., 14.3).

14. For this inward turn and its Platonic background, see Augustine’s *Invention of the Inner Self*, chapters 3 and 5.


16. *Soliloquies* 2:32. For a fuller discussion of Augustine’s distinction between *verum* and *veri simile*, which in his early work parallels the intelligible-sen-

17. See ibid., 22–23, 32–34.

18. I make the argument for the absence of a semiotic theory of language in Greek philosophy in *Outward Signs*, chapter 1. I present Augustine’s semiotics and its sources in chapter 3.

19. That language is a product of the fall is something Augustine hints at on a number of occasions. The opposite side of the coin is the notion that in the kingdom of God there will be no need for language, because minds will be able to see minds directly. Augustine is the first Christian writer known to me to develop this idea, based on some notions in Plotinus.


21. For further discussion of the inner word in Augustin,